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THE POLITICS OF "STAR WARS"
Jerome Grossman*
Many regard the nuclear arms race with fatalism: technology out of control.
The multibillion dollar Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) represents a different,
but equally threatening phenomenon: politics out of control. The driving force
for President Ronald Reagan's program was and remains political manipulation-
not military necessity, not technological fix.
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SDI
The so-called "Star Wars" initiative was launched by President Reagan in
1983, but the idea of a shield against nuclear attack had been developed three
years earlier by the policy research operation of Reagan's 1980 election campaign.
At the time, it was turned down for political reasons; the campaign advisors
feared it would undercut Reagan's demand for newer and more powerful nuclear
weapons.I
Seemingly out of the blue, Reagan revived the old strategic defense idea on
March 23, 1983 at the end of a speech praising his other military programs. In
a surprising and quite personal message, he called on our scientists to render
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" by setting up a space shield to protect
the population of the United States from nuclear annihilation. 2 The new Reagan
approach emphasized the moral and ethical objections to "mutual assured
destruction" 3 the doctrine which some experts say has kept the peace between
the superpowers by holding their populations hostage.
It is no coincidence that Reagan's utopian vision was offered at a time when
the peace movement at home and abroad was making great headway in destroying
the delusion that a nuclear war is survivable. By adopting the rhetoric of the
antinuclear movement, Reagan was shamelessly preempting its idealism for po-
litical purposes.
A perfect example was the Reagan Administration's use of the nuclear winter
theory to attack deterrence and promote the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Administration leaders co-opted a favorite theme of the peace movement and
used it to promote Star Wars even though they had originally attacked nuclear
winter as scientifically unsound. On March 7, 1985, Robert C. McFarlane, then
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, said:
Executive Officer, Council for a Livable World; President, Council for a Livable World
Education Fund; Lecturer, Tufts University. A.B., Harvard University, 1938. The Council for
a Livable World is a Boston-based public affairs organization devoted to nuclear disarmament.
1. M. ANDERSON, REVOLUTION 85-87 (1988).
2. See Address of President Reagan to the Nation on Defense and National Security 1 PuB.
PAPERS 437 (Mar. 23, 1987). This is often referred to as Reagan's "Star Wars speech."
3. Since the superpowers' mutual development of the hydrogen bomb, the balance between the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. has rested on the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" or MAD. See
generally Gray, The Missile Defense Debate in the Early 1970's, reprinted in PROMISE OR PERIL:
TIta STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITATrVE at 33 (Z. Brzezinski ed. 1986).
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Many of those who oppose SDI advocate reliance on assured destruction in
order to keep the peace. Let me point out something about assured destruction.
There has been much discussion about nuclear winter recently. While there are
many uncertainties, one thing is clear. Nuclear winter is most likely to be caused
by the smoke and dust from burning cities that have been attacked by nuclear
weapons. Everything in our Administration's strategic weapons policy, including
SDI, is designed to move us away from that kind of attack.
4
STAR WARS CONSTITUENTS
President Reagan offered contradictory policies on Star Wars to satisfy
various constituencies. His repeated pledge to share a space-based antimissile
system with the Soviet Union plays well in the era of General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev's immense popularity in the United States. At the same time the
Reagan Administration fought to keep out of Soviet hands the same advanced
computers, software, and lasers. They stepped up efforts to keep even high-
technology goods sold in American retail stores or exported to allied nations
from making their way to the Soviet bloc.' This highly publicized effort pleases
the "peace through strength" constituency.
Star Wars is immensely pleasing to the religious and secular fundamentalists
of the far right who were on a political roll in the United States during the early
days of the program. They share a vigorous repugnance to dealing with the
Kremlin, proclaiming that all past efforts at nuclear arms control have been futile
and that most have benefitted the Soviet Union and weakened the United States.
Such attacks ignore the manifest mutual benefits of the Partial Test Ban Treaty,
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty,
as well as the limits negotiated by SALT I and SALT II. Star Wars caters to
the obsessive urge to build up the U.S. nuclear arsenal and to impede efforts to
halt the arms spiral through diplomacy. If the Russians cannot be trusted, a plan
to knock down their missiles is better than dealing with them.
THE IMPERATIVES OF POLITICS
Successful politicians are commonly regarded as unprincipled because they
cater to public opinion. In fact, their political imperative is based on two firmly
held principles: get in power and stay in power. For them, a careful reading of
public opinion is an absolute necessity and supersedes ideology. Of the imperatives
driving the nuclear arms race, the economic, the technological, the strategic, and
the eschatological always seem to dominate on the surface. The media is preoc-
cupied with weapons technology and superpower strategizing, but the primary
imperative is domestic politics: who will control the nation. Politics is paramount.
Everything else is secondary, even national security.
In the 1960 elections, John F. Kennedy reheated the Cold War by outflanking
superhawk Richard Nixon, charging that the United States was in mortal danger
4. McFarlane, Strategic Defense Initiative, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUB.
AFF., CURRENT POLICY (No. 670) at 3 (1985).
5. Many in the Reagan Administration were very hesitant to share SDI-related technology, as
proposed by President Reagan. See, e.g., the following op-ed columns by William Safire: N.Y.
Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at A35, col. 1 and Nov. 21, 1985, at A35, col. 1.
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because the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration had allowed a missile gap to form.
Historical evidence shows that Kennedy knew the charges to be false.
6
In 1962, Kennedy went to the brink of nuclear war over missiles in Cuba.
The United States had hundreds of nuclear missiles capable of reaching the Soviet
Union; the Soviets had less than ten that could reach the United States. Kennedy
refused a quid pro quo that could have defused the crisis earlier because he felt
he had to prove to the American public that he could stand up to Nikita
Khrushchev. The 1964 election was looming and Senators Kenneth Keating and
Barry Goldwater and the ubiquitous Nixon were attacking Kennedy daily for
failing to protect the nation.
7
In 1976, candidate Jimmy Carter ran on a platform that called for zero
nuclear weapons. However, in his 1980 campaign he tried to outdo his hardliner
opponent, Ronald Reagan, by issuing Presidential Directive 59, a nuclear war
fighting doctrine that poisoned and destabilized superpower relations. Carter did
this because he had seen public opinion data calling for a tougher America.
8
Public opinion also had its part in SDI's origins. To an American electorate
that overwhelmingly supported the nuclear freeze, Star Wars was intended to
show that Reagan's goal, like theirs, was to end the arms race. This was even
as he built a multitude of new offensive nuclear weapons. And in fact, at least
as far as public opinion goes, Star Wars has worked.
Abraham Lincoln said, "What I want is to get done what the people desire
to have done, and the question for me is how to find that out exactly." Nancy
Reagan is said to have asked over and over, "What is the pulse of the country?"
The White House takes polls every week on nuclear arms control and other
issues. In so doing, it is applying its virtually unlimited political resources to
follow a developing trend in American politics. What is this trend? Simply this:
discover what the voters feel through public opinion polls, then give it back to
them in the most simplified form on television.
According to Rick Reed, a former staff member with the Republican Sena-
torial Campaign Committee, polling in 1983 indicated that public support for a
nuclear freeze and fear of nuclear war could be vulnerable points for the President
in the 1984 elections. In response, Reagan effectively defused the threat by
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and launching SDI, while
simultaneously waging an anti-Soviet advertising campaign.
All of the public opinion polls taken during the 1984 campaign gave Reagan
positive ratings for his stated Star Wars goals. These polls revealed that Americans
were inclined to support Star Wars if described as a defensive system. However,
6. F. KAPLAN, TmE WIZARDS OF ARMAGEDDON 155-61. See also Hilsman, How the Missile Gap
Closed Up, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1987, at A26, col. 1 (letter to the editor). Roger Hilsman,
who was State Department director of intelligence and research during the Kennedy Adminis-
tration, acknowledged that Kennedy, as a U.S. Senator, knew from classified material to which
he had senatorial access that the U.S. led the U.S.S.R. in missiles. Kennedy later claimed that
his campaign warnings were not disingenuous, but stemmed from his worry that in the future
the U.S. might lose its edge. Id.
7. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 3 (1971).
8. Burt, Carter Said to Back a Plan for Limiting Any Nuclear War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1980,
at Al, col. 1 (detailing the Carter Administration's decision to shift priority of U.S. nuclear
targets in the U.S.S.R. from civilian to military).
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the idea of putting nuclear weapons in space made them, and continues to make
them, extremely nervous.
People tend to believe that proposed systems can be made workable, but
they are very concerned about the cost. The American public prefers an assured
defense to mutually assured destruction. But, even more than these, it prefers an
agreement that would ban nuclear weapons from space. 9 As popular as Star
Wars may be with Americans, the INF Treaty, an agreement to eliminate an
entire class of nuclear weapons, attracts greater support. 10
SDI: Where Reagan and Disney Meet
Politics and entertainment have always been tightly interwoven in the United
States, a nation that denies its conflicts of ideology and class. The popular zeal
for political entertainment has been readily apparent to European visitors since
Alexis de Tocqueville described the unique role politics played in American social
life in the 1830's. Oratory and whisky were prime ingredients in the political
process from the cities of the east coast to the western frontier. Lincoln's brilliant
address at Gettysburg was received with hardly a murmur; it was too short, not
entertaining enough. The great enthusiasm was reserved for Edward Everett, who
thundered for hours from the same podium. Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative was born in an American popular culture dominated by space adventure
movies like Star Trek, Star Wars and Close Encounters of the Third Kind. In
SDI, fantasy and policy merged.
Star Wars, both the Reagan program and the movie, played an important
role in diverting the American public from the very difficult domestic problems
facing the Reagan Administration: the trade imbalance, which has caused the
pressure for protectionism; the desperate plight of American farms, which ended
Republican dominance of the United States Senate; the enormous federal deficit,
now totally out of control; and the attacks on the Social Security system, which
have alienated many voters.
Beyond these issues, Star Wars seeks to capitalize on the growing sense of
American nationalism. Americans harbor a growing resentment that America and
its ideals of liberty are underappreciated around the world. Americans fear that
their once omnipotent republic is losing its grip on world events. Alas, the rest
of the world is catching up all too quickly. The notion of "Fortress America"
9. Schneider, Public Prefers Arms Negotiations to Star Wars, 17 NAT'L J. 2008 (1985). See also,
J. MARTTILA & T. KILEY, A NATIONAL STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR WAR AND ARMS
CONTROL (1985).
10. A March 1985 poll by the Roper Organization produced the following resuks to this question:
"Do you think that the United States should or should not build a space-based defense
system?"
Should ..................... 54%
Should Not ............... 340oo
An October 1987 survey conducted by John Marttila and Tom Kiley produced the following
results:
"Do you approve or disapprove of the agreement to sign a treaty to eliminate intermediate-
range nuclear missiles based in Europe and in the Soviet Union.?"
Approve .................. 720o
Disapprove ............... 2007o
Don't Know .............. 8076
[Vol. 15:93
"Star Wars"
appeals to a nation that, in addition to cheering its own national anthem, selects
as its top favorite a song called "Born in the U.S.A."'1
Americans have not yet come to terms with their Cold War vulnerability to
foreign attack. Since 1814, no foreign military force has set foot on American
soil. Now, however, in the shadow of Hiroshima, we can no longer rely on our
Atlantic and Pacific security blankets. American public opinion gyrates around
the nation's shocking new vulnerability. Every presidential administration since
the Second World War has reflected the ambivalence of public opinion as to
defense in a nuclear age. Every president since Eisenhower has both reviled the
Soviet Union and negotiated treaties with that rival. And the presidents who
were the fiercest anticommunists, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, have
negotiated the most important treaties, because they were the best politicians.
They understood the schizophrenic nature of American public opinion. They were
the best at convincing Americans that they met both their concerns about the
Soviets and their concerns about nuclear war.
SDI: Where Science and Sci-Fi Meet
Americans have a belief, almost religious in nature, in the miracle of science.
Research has magical properties. In the laboratory, nothing is impossible. 12 Science
is the new frontier of American civilization, and it offers unlimited expansion.
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative can be seen as an antiseptic science fiction
military adventure. It is not sweaty and dirty like Vietnam was; it is more like
a Western in white lab coats.
This quintessentially American mood was well described by David Parnas,
an American citizen who teaches at the University of Victoria, British Columbia,
and who served as an SDI consultant to the United States Office of Naval
Research. Parnas resigned his consultancy on SDI, for which he was being paid
one thousand dollars a day, and gave the following reason:
11. Howard, The Bewildered American Raj, 270 HARPER'S MAO. 55 (1985). Michael Howard,
Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, blames the historical, cultural and geographical
isolation of the U.S. for its ignorance of other societies, and maintains that that ignorance
underlies the erosion of U.S. influence abroad. This has, in turn, engendered U.S. resentment
toward the rest of the world:
[Almid all th[e] wealth and excellence [of modern America] I [have] perceived a mood
of resentment on the part of most Americans, a mood that, I believe, helped bring the
Reagan Administration to power.... Why, Americans ask, are our acheivements not
universally recognized and admired? Why does American generosity not evoke more
gratitude? Why has American economic power and military strength not brought more
influence in the world? Why are small countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East
able to defy the United States, and to gain such widespread support when they do?
Why is the United States always in a minority at the United Nations, which it did so
much to create and still does so much to sustain? .... [T]here is a real element of
tragedy in America's relation with the wider world-an element that must be understood
before anything can be done to remedy the situation.
Id. at 55-56.
12. See generally Am. PoL. REP. 14. (July 12, 1985). See also Yankelovich, Science and the Public
Process: Why the Gap Must Close, 1 IssuEs i SCIENCE & TECH. 6 (1985). Public opinion
expert Daniel Yankelovich sees a "troubling disparity between the scientific sophistication of
our culture and its social and political backwardness." Id. He describes how science and
technology achieved enormous prestige in the years directly following the Second World War,
during which new discoveries "stimulate[d] a naive belief in science magic"-an assumption
that science and technology could solve any and all problems.... [and an] ideology [which]
held that science offered a superior path to truth, perhaps even the exclusive path." Id. at 9.
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Imagine President Reagan woke up one morning and decided he wanted to
build a rocket faster than light-the rocket could deliver a nuclear warhead to
the Soviet Union before it could even be seen. And so he creates a Faster than
Light Initiative. People would make the same arguments in favor of FLI-
sponsored research that they are now making for SDI work: we have to research
the problem before we can say if it will work; and wouldn't it be fun to try and
build one?"
A standard popular defense of Star Wars is that it is only a research
program, and that we will have plenty of time to decide later on whether to
develop and test and deploy. the thing. This seems unlikely. Anyone who has
studied the ineffectual efforts of Leo Szilard, James Franck and Albert Einstein
to prevent the atomic bombing of Hiroshima can have little confidence that a
decisive weapon that works will not be deployed. Robert Oppenheimer, William
Groves and Harry Truman were determined to complete their mission. And since
that time, no major weapons system urged by a president or his chiefs of staff
has failed to be deployed.
SDI opponents are sweet-talked: Star Wars is only research, and who can
be against research? Yet, earlier phases of the arms race have taught us that
research tends to generate vested interests, that a modicum of success inevitably
leads to development, that development leads to deployment-and another ex-
pensive and dangerous system is fixed in our arsenal. Vested interests of con-
tractors help weapons systems to survive. Corporations currently researching the
feasibility of various aspects of SDI are the selfsame ones that will win further
contracts if the programs are indeed found to be feasible.
'1 4
THE POLITICAL DANGERS OF CONCILIATION
The history of the Cold War in the United States shows that there is grave
political danger in failing to match the Soviets weapon for weapon, regardless
of military need. It is important to avoid accusations of being "soft on Com-
munism" or "soft on defense." The safest political course is to build every
weapon suggested by the military. To this day, right wing Republicans at all
political levels regularly accuse Democrats of unilateral disarmament, even though
every weapon system built by the Reagan Administration, except the B-1 bomber,
was alive during the Carter Administration.
The Star Wars research program is not new. It is a gathering together of
laser, particle beam, and other modern technologies begun by previous admin-
istrations. But the public relations and the political effects are new. Even the
Democrats are mesmerized and hesitant to attack for fear of being labelled as
soft on defense. In the early eighties, Star Wars rhetoric helped push animosity
against the Russians to an all-time high. However, the economic burden of the
military buildup and the unexpected onset of glastnost tipped public opinion in
the other direction, and so political pressures demanded that Reagan negotiate a
treaty with the Soviets.
13. Parnas is quoted in Lavin, Star Struck, in the Sept.-Oct. 1985 issue of NUCLEAR TBes.
14. Sanger, "Star Wars" Industry Rises, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at DI, col. 3 (describes the
optimism of the space weapons industry concerning SDI-related contracts, which numbered
over 1,500 at this time).
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To some degree the survival of the Star Wars project depends upon the
Soviet Union. If the Russians keep appearing alarmed by SDI, it will be politically
impossible for Congress to vote it down. There may be a Catch-22 here: If the
Russians are alarmed, we are on the right track and should continue the buildup.
If they are not alarmed, we obviously have not built up enough and so should
pour more money into it. Believers in Star Wars are particularly anxious to
deploy even a limited version of their system in hopes that it will then become
a sacred cow invulnerable to changing administrations.
Star Wars is the logical sucessor to the discredited civil defense program.
Like nuclear civil defense, the illusion that Star Wars would protect the population
makes fighting a nuclear war seem more feasible. Similarly, space weapons make
nuclear war seem more remote. It gives Americans the psychological strength to
endure the anxiety and expense of a frantic nuclear arms race. For the grand
solution is always just around the corner.
With the growing public resistance to expansion of the military budget,
Reagan has found a way, through Star Wars, to retain the momentum of his
armament program. George Ball, Undersecretary of State during the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations, wrote:
Perhaps the most effective support for Star Wars is now being generated
not by ideology but by good free-enterprise greed. Firms in the hypertrophic
defense industry, along with their thousands of technicians, are manifesting a
deep patriotic enthusiasm for Star Wars. Since they are experienced in lobbying
and wield heavy influence with members of Congress who have defense plants
in their districts, they are creating formidable momentum for the project. Whether
or not it would contribute to the security of the nation, if offers them security.
Thus, an investment analyst for the industry published a newsletter about the
President's space program entitled "Money from Heaven" while another analyst
wrote: "For the U.S. aerospace industry the redirection of the strategic arms
competition toward defense can hardly come soon enough.""
SDI is already generating political contributions from contract-hungry companies
to key members of Congress. If past experience is any guide, the Pentagon will
seek to place SDI-related contracts in all 435 congressional districts.
In addition, the Pentagon is trying to buy up brains by throwing money at
the institutions of higher education in the United States. This has met with with
some success and has led to some notable failures. Sheldon L. Glashow, a Nobel
Prize-winning physicist at Harvard, signed a no-research pledge recently. He said,
"I would give Star Wars a "D" because it is a danger to peace, a disinclination
to arms control, deleterious to American science, and it is destabilizing, dumb,
and damned expensive."
'' 6
Recent governmental studies have echoed the scientific community's criticisms
of Star Wars. A study released by the congressional Office of Technology
Assessment in June 1988 concluded, "there would be a significant probability
15. Ball, The War for Star Wars, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Apr. 11, 1985, at 38, 40.
16. Campbell, Latest Cause on Campus: Saying No to Star Wars, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, at
A52, col. 1 (covers efforts by the United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War to enroll scientists
and engineers in a pledge not to perform SDI-related research). See also Sanger, Campuses'
Role in Arms Debated as "Star Wars" Funds Are Sought, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1985, at Al,
col. 2 and N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
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that the first and presumably only time the ballistic missile defense system were
used in a real war, it would suffer a catatrophic failure."
1 7
The NATO nations are also understandably nervous about Star Wars. They
read the implications as tending to create a "Fortress America" which would
leave them outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella and harm prospects for a strategic
arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union. Some dismiss the scheme as an
attempt to build a Maginot Line in space. Europeans might also fear that the
battlefield use of nuclear arms in Europe becomes more likely as the superpowers
develop strong defenses.' 8 Though the Pentagon is offering space research con-
tracts to allies of the United States, the allies fear relegation to marginal tasks
while SDI's overall direction-and most of its economic benefits-remain with
U.S. corporations. As the former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, has said, since SDI is a
weapons project, and largely secret, the allies' participation must necessarily be
limited to unclassified work. It can be expected that even this policy will generate
stiff resistance from U.S. firms that will wish to keep even less important projects
to themselves so as to apply the resulting unclassified research to civilian tech-
nology.
CONCLUSION
In the name of nuclear disarmament, the Reagan Administration postured
as the conscience of humanity. All the while, it sought to reinforce its political
hegemony over the United States and its allies-with a Star Wars program that
may work in the political arena, but not in the sky.
Will it succeed? Is Star Wars inevitable?
Not necessarily. Each of the arguments favoring the continuation of the Star
Wars program has a built-in countervailing argument. The most powerful is the
enormous cost of the program, already funded at over four billion dollars a
year. As the cost escalates, there will be political trouble because of worry about
the federal deficit and the inevitability of higher taxes. Americans are highly
subject to fads; space can be replaced as a prime interest. It is becoming apparent
that the great claims made for SDI are merely rhetorical, that the system cannot
possibly deliver the security once promised.
All in all, the dominance of political motives behind SDI creates several
opportunities for those who oppose Star Wars. In the United States and Western
Europe, numerous scientists and activists remain committed to ending the nuclear
arms race in space and on the earth. Under our free institutions, they have the
responsibility and potential power to reshape public opinion.
The power of the world peace movement has been demonstrated by the
softening of pro-SDI rhetoric. In a perverse way, Star Wars represents a political
concession by the proponents of nuclear strength. At this point, the movement's
17. Hochbrueckner & McCloskey, A Sensible Initiative for the SDI Budget, 18 ARmS CONTROL
TODAY 3 (June 1988).
18. See, e.g., Howe's UDIfrom SDI, The Times (London), Mar. 18, 1985, at 13, col. 1 (editorial)
(criticizing Sir Geoffrey Howe, the foreign minister of the U.K., for a recent major speech in
which he expressed worry that SDI may create a greater likelihood of tactical nuclear war in
Europe).
[Vol. 15:93
1989] "Star Wars" 101
next challenge is to force a serious rethinking of nuclear weapons policy. It can
only do this by making that policy subject to the political power of those who
advocate the dismantling of global war machines.

